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Abstract 
This paper researches the impact that shadow banking in China has upon credit creation and the 
potential effectiveness of monetary policy. Using a credit creation model, we derive the effect that 
shadow banking has upon the money multiplier and the money supply. The model shows that shadow 
banking can change the money multiplier, potentially increasing it during an expansion and decreasing 
it during a contraction. Introducing shadow banking in a CC-LM model results in a shift of the CC and 
LM curves resulting in a higher equilibrium output. A vector autoregressive model is used to empirically 
estimate the impact of shadow banking deposits' growth rate on the growth rates of the broad money 
supply, GDP, and the CPI. The results show that shadow banking's credit creation function in China 
has a pro-cyclical characteristic, potentially reducing the money supply's controllability and increasing 
the difficulty in effectively regulating monetary policy. This paper introduces shadow banking into the 
currency creation process of traditional commercial banks, accounting for the reserve requirement ratio, 
the excess reserve ratio, the shadow bank leakage rate, and the reserved deduction rate. Future 
research can determine whether coordinating monetary policy and leverage ratio regulation mitigates 
the impact of shadow banking. Another area of research is how the shadow banking of non-financial 
companies affect monetary policy.  
Keywords: Shadow banking; Credit creation; Monetary policy; CC-LM model; VAR model  
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Introduction 
In recent years, China's shadow banking system has expanded rapidly. According to Moody's monthly 
monitoring report, China's broad shadow banking assets reached renminbi (RMB) 59.6 trillion in the first half 
of 2019, accounting for 64% of the nominal gross domestic product (GDP) of China. According to data from 
the People's Bank of China, the RMB bank loans in China accounted for 68% of social financing scale in 
October 2019, compared with 92% in 2012. The proportion of Chinese banking loans in total social financing 
has declined, and shadow banking has developed rapidly. Growth in shadow banking increases its uncertain 
impact on monetary policy.  
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2014) states that shadow banking can expand access to credit and 
support market liquidity, maturity transformation, and risk-sharing. However, there are some significant 
differences between China's shadow banking system and the developed countries' shadow banking systems. 
Shadow banking of developed countries is the non-bank financial institutions that rest outside the banking 
system. They focus on asset securitization and financial innovation. Shadow banking in China is mainly inside 
the banking system and is dominated by commercial banks, which has led to its description as "the shadow 
of the bank" (Sun, 2019). Shadow banking in China performs a similar function as commercial banks by 
issuing safe assets to finance loans. Elliott et al. (2015) also verify that shadow banking in China is considered 
"bank loans in disguise." They find that two-thirds of the flow of funds into shadow banking is from banks and 
that the other third are related to non-banks in China. Allen et al. (2019) find that entrusted loans are among 
China's largest shadow banking components. Entrusted loans occur when firms with access to inexpensive 
capital channel funds to firms with restricted capital access. Entrusted loans increase during periods of tight 
credit. 
 
The differences in shadow banking in China and more developed countries inevitably lead to different impact 
mechanisms of shadow banking on monetary policy. In developing economies such as China, the bank 
lending channel is weakened when the response of aggregate bank loans is offset by the response of shadow 
banking credit (Liu et al., 2019). In developed economies such as America, shadow money, namely liquid 
deposits created by shadow banks, expands significantly when the Federal Reserve tightens monetary 
policy. In this paper, we analyze China's shadow banking's influence mechanism on the effectiveness of 
monetary policy theoretically and empirically to provide a scientific reference for the formulation and 
implementation of China's monetary policy. 
 
This study analyzes the following three issues: (i) How does China's shadow bank system participate in the 
credit creation process, and correspondingly, how does it affect the money supply? (ii) How does the credit 
creation of China's shadow bank system affect economic growth? (iii) From an empirical perspective, how 
does the credit creation of China's shadow banks impact monetary policy effectiveness? 
 
For the first issue, we have incorporated shadow banking into the currency creation process of traditional 
commercial banks, taking into account the role of the reserve requirement ratio, the excess reserve ratio, the 
shadow bank leakage rate, and the reserved deduction rate. By analyzing the credit creation process of 
shadow banking, we measure its impact on the money supply. We find that during an expansion, the shadow 
banking system has an expansionary impact on the money supply, while during a downturn, its impact is 
contractionary; thus, increasing the difficulty of the central bank's regulation of monetary policy 
 
For the second issue, we introduce the credit market into the IS-LM model and obtain a CC-LM model that 
integrates the credit market, commodity market, and currency market. We use the CC-LM to analyze the 
impact mechanism of the credit creation function of China's shadow bank system on economic growth. We 
find that credit creation by the shadow banking system credit and shift the CC and LM curves resulting in an 
increased equilibrium point for economic output.   
 
For the third issue, we use a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to study the impact of credit creation of 
China's shadow banks on monetary policy effectiveness. We selected indicators such as money supply, 
economic growth, and price levels, and used monthly data from January 2008 to December 2018 as the 
research sample, and analyzed it using Eviews 9.0 software. 
 
Our main results are as follows. First, China's shadow banking impacts credit creation and money supply. 
The lower the reserve deduction rate of the shadow bank, and the higher the leakage rate, the stronger its 
   Zhang et al. / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 9 No 4, 2020 
  ISSN: 2147-4486 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
 
P
ag
e3
5
 
P
ag
e3
5
 
P
ag
e3
5
 
credit creation ability. Second, China's shadow banking credit creation can increase output levels and 
promote economic growth. Third, the empirical analysis shows that China's shadow banks' credit creation 
will impact monetary policy effectiveness. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 develops a theoretical 
model of China's shadow banking's impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy based on shadow bank 
credit creation. Section 4 utilizes a VAR model for an empirical test using data from 2008 to 2018, 
demonstrating the impact of China's shadow bank credit creation on macroeconomic variables. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the results and suggestions for policy changes and future research. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
This study relates to several strands of the expanding literature on shadow banking in China. First, it is closely 
related to research that explains the risk of shadow banking and its effect on financial stability. Previous 
studies indicate that shadow banking's growth is driven mainly by regulatory arbitrage, especially the 
arbitrage of capital requirements (Pozsar, et al., 2010; Plantin, 2014). In the context of regulatory arbitrage 
and neglected risks, shadow banks evade capital requirements and use "too big to fail" to influence financial 
stability via various channels. (Harris et al., 2014; Huang, 2018; Plantin, 2015). Empirical evidence of 
regulatory arbitrage is found in Acharya et al. (2013), Demyanyk and Loutskina (2016), and Buchak et al. 
(2018). Bengtsson (2013) also finds that shadow banking may affect financial stability. In the short-run, the 
shadow bank share rose when deposit interest rate ceilings were binding on traditional banks, the economic 
outlook improved, or risk premia declined and fell when event risks arose (Duca, 2016). Pozsar et al. (2010) 
and Jeffers and Baicu (2013) also indicate that the interconnections between regular banking and shadow 
banking activities negatively affect financial stability. Wu and Shen (2019) propose that a bank that engages 
in shadow banking tends to take considerable risks; however, good governance mechanisms can 
significantly reduce risk-taking. 
  
Second, our study is related to existing studies about the impact of shadow banking on the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) indicate that monetary policy 
credit transmission channels also apply to the shadow banking system. F. Verona (2011) uses the traditional 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to analyze the impact of shadow banking on 
monetary policy. The results show that loose monetary policy can promote shadow banking's rapid 
development, which will impact the achievement of monetary policy goals. Moe (2014) finds that the market 
sensitivity of securitized derivatives designed and issued by the shadow banking system during the credit 
creation process is relatively high. It makes the entire credit chain unstable and increases the central bank's 
restrictions on the shadow banking system's credit expansion. Based on a revised IS-LM model and a 
structural VAR (SVAR) model, Zhen and Hui (2014) find that shadow banking affects monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms such as credit and interest rates, making it more difficult for the central bank to 
regulate macroeconomics through monetary policy tools. Mazelis (2014) uses a DSGE model to show that 
the effect of monetary policy credit transmission will significantly weaken as the size of shadow banking 
increases. Based on the Dynamic New Keynesian - DSGE model, Xiang and Qianglong (2014) find that 
shadow banking complements the traditional financial system to a certain extent; however, its countercyclical 
effect impacts the effectiveness of monetary policy. Yang et al. (2019) develop a model of the Chinese 
economy using a DSGE framework that accommodates interaction between traditional banks and shadow 
banks. Financial frictions in the shadow banking sector create a "dual financial acceleration" mechanism that 
negatively affects monetary policy transmission and macroprudential policy's effectiveness. 
 
Other studies find that monetary policy also affects shadow banking. Nelson et al. (2018) find a contractionary 
monetary policy reduces commercial bank assets' but increases shadow banks' assets. Several studies, 
including Mazelis (2016) and Chen et al. (2018a, 2018b), confirm this finding. Chen et al. (2018a, 2018b) 
find that contractionary monetary policy encourages banks to increase investments in entrusted assets to 
circumvent the loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) and safe-loan regulations. 
 
Finally, our study is also related to the literature on shadow banking's effect on the intermediate targets and 
the ultimate monetary policy goals. Using a Bayesian vector auto-regression (BVAR) model, Fei (2018) finds 
that shadow banking has a cyclical effect on the money supply. Lemma (2016) shows that the development 
of shadow banking is conducive to achieving equilibrium in the currency market and realizing monetary policy 
goals. Moreira and Savov (2017) find that shadow banks can transform risky assets into liquid securities 
under normal conditions to stimulate economic growth. However, when economic uncertainty surges, the 
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liquidity of securities tends to be inadequate, which will increase financial vulnerability. Yaming and Qiqi 
(2018) use a time-varying-parameter vector-autoregressive (TVP-VAR) model and find that China's shadow 
bank system has a pro-cyclicality, which has a positive effect on economic growth and price levels but 
reduces the measurability and controllability of the money supply, making it more difficult for the central bank 
to implement monetary policy. 
 
These studies examine shadow banking from three perspectives: its risk for financial stability, its impact on 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism, its effect on the intermediate targets, and the ultimate goals of 
monetary policy. This paper's contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we consider the role of reserve 
requirement ratio, excess reserve ratio, shadow bank leakage rate, and reserve deduction rate; second, we 
consider the cyclical impact of shadow banking on monetary policy. This paper adds to the literature by 
incorporating shadow banking into the currency creation process of traditional commercial banks; using a 
CC-LM model that integrates the credit market, commodity market, and currency market to analyze the 
impact of China's shadow bank system on economic growth; and using a VAR model to study the impact of 
China's shadow banks on the efficacy of monetary policy. 
 
 
Research and Methodology 
 
Shadow banking impacts both the intermediate and the ultimate goals of monetary policy. The intermediary 
targets for monetary policy transmission are mainly money supply and interest rates. Since changes in the 
money supply will inevitably affect interest rates, we focus on the money supply among these two 
intermediary targets. Among the four ultimate monetary policy goals, full employment and price stability are 
the internal equilibrium goals; the balance of payments is the external equilibrium goal. Economic growth is 
the ultimate goal of implementing monetary policy. Among these four ultimate goals, we focus on the ultimate 
goal of economic growth. Through the impact of shadow banking on the money supply and economic growth, 
we analyze its influence mechanism on monetary policy effectiveness.  
 
China's shadow banking system's operating model is rooted in the commercial banking system as it cannot 
directly accept deposits from the residential sector. The main form of operation is to transfer funds from the 
on-balance-sheet to the off-balance-sheet of commercial banks and to obtain interest margin benefits through 
lending at a higher interest rate. In China, the funds of shadow banks ultimately come from commercial 
banks, and the transfer and settlement of large amounts of funds are still mainly carried out through the 
banking system. We incorporate China's shadow banking system into the credit creation process of 
commercial banks and analyze its impact on the money supply. 
 
We make the following assumptions. First, the financial system consists of the central bank, commercial 
banks, and shadow banks. The commercial bank system provides both traditional banking business and 
shadow banking business. Second, commercial banks need to maintain reserves per the central bank's 
provisions, assuming the reserve requirement ratio is rd and the excess reserve ratio is re. Third, shadow 
banking products' profitability is higher, both for customers and commercial banks, resulting in a portion of 
commercial banking products shunted to the shadow banking sector. Assume that the proportion of the 
shunted deposits to the total commercial bank deposits is the shadow bank leakage rate (v).  Fourth, similar 
to the commercial bank reserve, the shadow bank withholds a part of the received funds to guarantee 
repayment. Assume that the ratio of the shadow bank's withholding funds to its liabilities is the reserved 
deduction rate (a).  Finally, customers do not withdraw cash, and all funds flow to commercial banks or 
shadow banks; that is, the cash leakage rate is zero. Finally, all the above parameters as rd, re, v, a are in 
the range of (0, 1). 
 
Assume that a customer deposits a deposit B into the first commercial bank and then transfer part of the 
deposit Bv to the first shadow bank. The deposit of the first commercial bank was reduced to B (1-v). The 
bank paid the statutory reserve B (1-v) rd to the central bank and withdrew the excess reserve B (1-v) re, and 
then lent the remaining funds B (1-v) (1-rd-re). After the first shadow bank left withholding funds Bva, the 
remaining funds Bv (1-a) were issued as shadow bank loans.  
 
After a round of credit creation, the total loan value for the commercial banks and shadow banking is B [(1-
v) (1-rd-re)+v (1-a)]. Then these funds will flow to the second commercial bank in the form of a derivative 
deposit. This process will be repeated following the previous round of deposit diversion and the re-creation 
process of loans and deposits by the shadow and commercial bank. Because there is no cash leakage, the 
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credit creation process will continue, and eventually, we can get the shadow bank's credit creation process, 
as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Credit creation process of shadow banking 
Stage Commerc-
ial bank 
deposits 
① 
Shadow 
bank 
deposits
② 
Statutory 
reserve 
③=(①-②)rd 
Excess reserve 
④=(①-②)re 
Commercial 
bank loans 
⑤=①-②-③-
④ 
Shadow bank 
loans 
⑥=②ｘ(1-a) 
Total 
loans 
⑤+⑥ 
1 B Bv B(1-v)rd B(1-v)re B(1-v)(1-rd-re) Bv(1-a) B[(1-v)(1-
rd-
re)+v(1-
a)] 
2 Bq Bqv Bq(1-v)rd Bq(1-v)re Bq(1-v)(1-rd-re) Bqv(1-a) Bq2 
… … … … … … … … 
N Bqn-1 Bqn-1v B qn-1(1-v)rd B qn-1(1-v)re Bqn-1(1-v)(1-rd-
re) 
Bqn-1v(1-a) - 
Total B/(1-q) Bv/(1-q) B(1-v)rd/(1-q) B(1-v)rd/(1-q) B(1-v)(1-rd-
re)/(1-q) 
Bv(1-a)/(1-q) Bq/(1-q) 
 
Let q = 𝑣(1 − 𝑎) + (1 − 𝑣)(1 − 𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟𝑒). After the first round of credit creation, the total new loans for shadow 
banks and commercial banks is Bq . From q = 𝑣(1 − 𝑎) + (1 − 𝑣)(1 − 𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟𝑒)， we can get q = 1 −
[(1 − 𝑣)(𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟𝑒) + 𝑣𝑎]. From [(1 − 𝑣)(𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟𝑒) + 𝑣𝑎]＜1, we can get 0 < q < 1. 
 
Therefore, if the original deposit is B, after n-time deposit derivation from the entire banking system, the final 
money supply is as follow： 
 
 M =
B
1−q
=
B
r𝑑+𝑣（𝑎−r𝑑）+r𝑒（1−𝑣)
  =
B
(r𝑑+r𝑒)+𝑣（𝑎−r𝑑−r𝑒）
     (1) 
 
The influence of shadow banking on the money supply mainly comes from two sources. First, the size of 
deposits of shadow banks shunted from the commercial banks. The more shunted deposits, the smaller the 
credit creation ability of commercial banks. Second, after the shadow bank shunts commercial bank deposits, 
the shadow bank will create credit by itself. The combined effect of these two aspects determines the effect 
of shadow banking on the money supply. In equation (1), the following relationship exists:   
 
𝑑𝑀
𝑑𝑟𝑑
=
(𝑣 − 1)𝐵
[r𝑑 + 𝑣（𝑎 − r𝑑） + r𝑒（1 − 𝑣)]
2
< 0 
𝑑𝑀
𝑑𝑟𝑒
=
(𝑣 − 1)𝐵
[r𝑑 + 𝑣（𝑎 − r𝑑）+ r𝑒（1 − 𝑣)]
2
< 0 
The equation shows an inverse relationship between the money supply, the reserve requirement ratio, and 
the excess reserve ratio. The higher the reserve requirement ratio and the excess reserve ratio, the smaller 
the commercial banks' credit creation ability, and the smaller the money supply and vice versa. 
 
① 
dM
d𝑎
=
−𝑣B
[r𝑑+𝑣(𝑎−r𝑑)+r𝑒(1−𝑣)
2 < 0.   
 
The equation shows an inverse relationship between the money supply and the shadow bank reserve 
deduction rate. The higher the shadow bank reserve deduction rate, the smaller the shadow bank's credit 
creation ability and the smaller the money supply and vice versa. 
 
② 
dM
d𝑣
=
（r𝑑+r𝑒−𝑎）B
（r𝑑+𝑣(𝑎−r𝑑)+r𝑒(1−𝑣)
2.  If r𝑑 + r𝑒 > 𝑎, then 
dM
d𝑣
> 0.  
 
That is, the money supply has a positive relationship with the shadow bank leakage rate. When the sum of 
the reserve requirement ratio and the excess reserve ratio of the commercial bank is greater than the 
reserved deduction rate, the higher the shadow bank leakage rate, the greater the money supply. 
Conversely, when the sum of the reserve requirement ratio and the excess reserve ratio of the commercial 
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bank is less than the reserved deduction rate of the shadow bank, the higher the shadow bank leakage 
rate, the smaller the money supply. If r𝑑 + r𝑒 = 𝑎, the shadow bank leakage rate has no significant effect 
on the money supply. 
 
According to the derivations above, the reserve deduction rate and the cash leakage rate to the shadow 
banking sector directly affects its credit creation ability. The more deposits shunted to the shadow bank and 
the lower its reserve deduction rate, the stronger its credit creation ability. As shadow banking is outside 
the financial supervision system, the reserved deduction rate is not controlled by the central bank. The 
shadow bank controls the reserve deduction rate according to its financing situation resulting in greater 
flexibility for the shadow bank. 
 
When the economy is growing, shadow banks will begin a new round of expansion through regulatory 
arbitrage. Shadow banks will reduce the reserve deduction rate, which enlarges the credit creation function. 
The money supply will increase. In theory, if the reserve deduction rate is infinitesimal, the total assets of 
the shadow bank will expand towards infinity. From a practical point of view, since shadow banks do not 
have a reserve requirement ratio and other regulatory constraints, they can have a more substantial credit 
creation function than traditional commercial banks. 
 
In an economic downturn, the general public investment expectation may not be optimistic. Shadow banks 
will increase the reserve deduction rate and reduce credit, which will lead to a reduction in the money supply 
in circulation. Meanwhile, the sum of the reserve requirement ratio and the excess reserve ratio of 
commercial banks may be less than the shadow bank reserve deduction rate, which reduces the money 
supply due to the shadow bank leakage rate.  
 
Therefore, the credit creation function of Chinese shadow banking has different effects on the money supply 
in different economic cycles thus reducing the measurability, controllability and correlation of money supply, 
and increasing the difficulty of the central bank's regulation of monetary policy, affecting the realization of 
the ultimate goal of Chinese monetary policy. During an expansion, the shadow banking system has an 
expansionary impact on the money supply, while during a downturn, its impact is contractionary. 
 
From the above analysis, we can see that China's shadow bank can divert the deposits of commercial banks 
and create credit, thereby affecting the intermediary goal of money supply and the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. Based on the previous analysis, this section draws on the CC-LM model constructed by Bernanke 
(1988) and introduces the credit market into the traditional IS-LM model. The CC-LM model integrates the 
credit, commodity, and currency markets. The CC-LM model can be used to analyze the mechanism of the 
credit creation function of China's shadow bank on economic growth. 
 
We make the following assumptions: ①the banking system consists of a traditional banking sector and a 
shadow banking sector; ②banks' assets consist of loans, bonds, and cash reserves, and there are two 
types of interest rates: bond interest rates and loan interest rates; ③The ratio between traditional banking 
and shadow banking and the ratio between loans and bond purchases are determined by the rational 
choices of the banking system to maximize profits; ④Three markets are involved: the credit market, the 
commodity market, and the money market. 
 
For the credit market, we set ρ as the loan interest rate, i as the bond interest rate, and y as the economic 
output. The loan demand function is: 
 
  𝐿𝑑 = 𝐿(𝜌, 𝑖, 𝑦)  (2) 
 
In equation (2)，the following relationships exist: 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜌
< 0. It means that the higher the loan interest rate, the 
higher the interest cost, and the lower the loan demand. 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑖
> 0. It reflects the substitution effect between 
bond financing and loan financing. When the bond interest rate decreases relative to the loan interest rate, 
the demand for loans increases. 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑦
> 0. It shows that the economic aggregate is positively correlated with 
the loan demand. That is, the larger the economic aggregate, the greater the demand for loans. 
 
We assume that D is the commercial bank deposits, 𝑟𝑑 is the reserve requirement ratio, 𝑟𝑒 is the excess 
reserve ratio. We assume that the assets of the commercial banks' balance sheet include reserves---R, 
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bonds---B and loans---𝐿𝑠 , and the liabilities include bank deposits---D and liabilities---𝑆𝑑  generated by 
shadow banking. "Assets = Liabilities + Equity," for simplicity Equity can be set to zero; we get:  
 
R + B + 𝐿𝑠 = 𝐷 + 𝑆𝑑   (3) 
 
Also, we know that R = 𝑟𝑑𝐷 + 𝑟𝑒𝐷，substituting it into equation (3), we can get: 
 
  B + 𝐿𝑠 = D(1 − 𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟𝑒) + 𝑆𝑑  (4) 
 
We assume that 𝑃𝑥 is the profit rate of shadow banking-related business of a commercial bank, and the 
liabilities generated by the shadow bank are a function of the profit rate: 
 
𝑠𝑑 = 𝑆𝐷(𝑃𝑥) (5) 
 
In equation (5), the larger 𝑃𝑥  is, the greater the profit of the shadow banking-related business of a 
commercial bank, the more the commercial banks tend to expand the shadow banking business, and the 
size of the shadow banking increases. The smaller 𝑃𝑥 is, the commercial banks do not tend to expand the 
shadow banking business, and the size of shadow banking decreases. 
 
In the commercial banks' assets, the required deposit reserve 𝑟𝑑𝐷 is determined exogenously by the central 
bank, and the excess reserve 𝑟𝑒𝐷 is determined by the commercial bank, assuming the excess reserve ratio 
𝑟𝑒 is stable. The commercial bank determines the holding ratio of loans and bonds. The commercial bank 
determines the loan supply based on comparing the loan interest rate with the bond interest rate. 
 
Assume λ, the loan supply ratio, is the proportion of loans in the total assets of the commercial bank. The 
loan supply allocation function is: 
 
λ = λ(𝜌, 𝑖) (6) 
 
In equation (6)，  
dλ
dρ
> 0  . It shows that the loan supply will increase with a higher loan interest rate. 
Also, 
dλ
d𝑖
< 0. It shows that profit-maximizing-banks will invest more funds into bonds when the bond interest 
rate rises, resulting in a reduction of the money supply. 
 
By equations (4), (5), and (6), we can get the loan supply function as: 
 
𝐿𝑠 = λ(𝜌, 𝑖)[D(1 − 𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟𝑒) + 𝑆𝐷(𝑃𝑥)    (7) 
 
The loan demand is equal to the loan supply when the credit market is in equilibrium. By equation (2) and 
(7), we can get the credit market equilibrium equation: 
 
𝐿(𝜌, 𝑖, 𝑦) = λ(𝜌, 𝑖)[D(1 − 𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟𝑒) + 𝑆𝐷(𝑃𝑥)    (8) 
 
From equation (8), we can see that shadow banking has expanded the bank's funding sources, thereby 
expanding the loan supply and leading to the expansion of loan demand. From R = (𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟𝑒)D, we can get: 
 
D =
𝑅
𝑟𝑑+𝑟𝑒
      (9) 
 
Substituting equation (9) into equation (8), and solving for the loan interest rate, we obtain: 
 
ρ = φ(𝑖, 𝑦，R，𝑃𝑥)   (10) 
 
The loan interest rate is a function of the bond interest rate, economic output, the total reserve ratio, and 
the profitability rate of the shadow banking sector.  
 
We can use the traditional IS curve equation when the commodity market is in equilibrium. 
 
𝑦 = Y（𝜌, 𝑖）    (11) 
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When the credit market and the commodity market are in equilibrium at the same time, the curve derived 
from combining formula (10) and formula (11) is the CC curve: 
 
𝑦 = Y[φ(𝑖, 𝑦，R，𝑃𝑥)，𝑖]  (12) 
 
Taking the first-order derivative of the equation (12) results in 
d𝑦 
d𝑖
< 0. It shows that economic output is 
inversely related to the bond interest rate. It can be seen that the CC curve is consistent with the traditional 
IS curve and slopes to the lower right. 
 
Finally, we analyze the money market where 𝑃 is the price level, and 𝑀𝑠 is the nominal money supply, which 
is controlled by the central bank. When the money supply is equal to the money demand, the money market 
is in equilibrium resulting in the LM curve. The LM curve is upward sloping in line with the trend of the IS-
LM curve. The LM curve equation is: 
 
M𝑑（𝑖, 𝑦） =
𝑀𝑠
𝑃
   (13) 
 
In summary, when the credit market, the commodity market, and the money market are in simultaneous 
equilibrium, the CC curve and the LM curve intersect at point E. The total economic output is Y1，as shown 
in Fig 1. However, due to the existence of shadow banks, the money supply of the whole society will change. 
In the credit market, because shadow banks have a high rate of return, idle social idle funds pursuing yield 
will transfer to shadow banks for a new round of expansion, stimulating investment and increasing output, 
causing the CC curve to move to the right to CC＇. 
 
In the money market, shadow banks divert some of the commercial banks' saved funds to create loans. 
Therefore, shadow banks can expand the economy’s money supply, causing the LM curve to move to the 
right to LM＇. As shown in Fig.1, the CC＇curve and the LM＇curve produce a new equilibrium point F. The 
corresponding economic output Y2 will increase. It indicates that China's shadow banks' credit creation 
function can increase output and promote economic growth. 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Findings 
Model and Data Selection 
Vector auto-regression (VAR) is a set of statistical models for multivariate time series analysis. It is commonly 
used to predict the dynamic impact of interconnected time-series systems and analyze disturbances on 
variable systems. It has comprehensive functions, including co-integration tests, the Granger Causality test, 
analysis of variance, and impulse function analysis. This paper uses the VAR model to study the impact of 
China's shadow banks' credit creation on monetary policy effectiveness. The mathematical expression of the 
VAR model is as follows: 
 
 y = 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 +······ 𝐴𝑞𝑦𝑡−𝑞 + 𝐵𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ，        𝑡 = 1,2,3,······ 𝑇        (14) 
 0 Y1                     Y2                           Y 
Y1         Y2               Y 
r 
LM 
LM＇ 
CC 
CC＇ 
E 
F 
Figure 1: CC-LM model including the shadow banking 
system. 
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Where yt is the column variable of the dimensional endogenous variable; xt is the dimensional external 
variable vector; q is the lag order; T is the number of samples. A1 ·····, Aq, and B are the coefficient matrices 
to be estimated, and εt is the perturbation vector. 
 
The first variable is the size of the shadow banks' credit creation. Based on previous literature, this paper 
selects bank entrusted loans, trust loans, and undiscounted bank acceptance bills to reflect the overall 
change of the size of shadow banks' credit creation. We use the monthly growth rate denoted by RSB.  
 
The second variable is the money supply. China's current monetary statistics system divides the money 
supply into three levels: M0, cash in circulation; M1, narrow money supply; M2, broad money supply. As M2 
reflects the total social demand, we include its monthly growth rate, denoted as RM2, as a measure.  
 
Another variable is the ultimate goal of Chinese monetary policy: stabilizing prices and promoting economic 
growth. Stabilizing prices is usually reflected by CPI. This paper adopts the monthly growth rate of CPI 
denoted by RCPI. Economic growth is generally measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, the 
current statistics on GDP data only have annual data and quarterly data. Therefore, this paper uses the 
quadratic-match average method to convert GDP quarterly data into GDP monthly data and uses the monthly 
growth rate, denoted by RGDP, as the measurement variable. This paper uses monthly data from January 
2008 to December 2018 for a total of 132 observations. The data comes from the Chinese National Bureau 
of Statistics, the People's Bank of China website, and the Wind database. 
 
Empirical analysis 
 
We begin by performing a stationarity test on the selected time series data before establishing a VAR model, 
to avoid a pseudo-regression. The results of the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) stationarity test of variables 
RSB, RM2, RCPI, and RGDP via the EViews 9.0 software are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Result of ADF stationarity test. 
Variable Test Form (C,T,L） Differential term ADF Test Value Threshold（5%） P  Stationarity 
RSB (C,L,2) 0 -4.041071 -3.445030 0.0097 Stationary 
RM2 (C,T,7) 0 -6.684178 -3.446464 0.000 Stationary 
RCPI (C,L,0) 0 -9.799122 -3.444487 0.0000 Stationary 
RGDP (C,T,11) 1 -4.970787 -3.448021 0.0005 Stationary 
Note：C is the constant term. T is the trend term. L is the lag term. 
 
From Table 2, we can see that the ADF statistics of the four sets of data RSB, RM2, RCPI, and RGDP are 
all less than the critical value at the 5% significance level, and there is no unit root, and the stationarity test 
is passed. Among them, RSB，RM2 and RCPI are zero-order single integer time series, and RGDP is a first-
order, single-time time series. These indicate that the data are stable and meet the conditions for establishing 
the VAR model. 
 
Based on data stability, this paper determines the optimal lag order of VAR model using the optimized log-
likelihood objective function (LogL), the log likelihood ratio (LR), final prediction error (FPE), Akaike 
information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC), and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). 
Table 3 shows the results. 
 
Table 3: Test results of the optimal lag order 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 1387.171 NA 4.83e-15 -21.61205 -21.52292 -21.57583 
1 1414.523 52.56827 4.05e-15 -21.78943 -21.34380 -21.60837 
2 1446.394 59.25840 3.16e-15 -22.03740 -21.23527 -21.71149 
3 1512.977 119.6427* 1.44e-15 -22.82777 -21.66913 -22.35701 
4 1565.933 91.84546 8.09e-16* -
23.40521* 
-
21.89007* 
-
22.78960* 
Note：* indicates the optimal lag order selected in each column of criteria. 
 
Based on the results in Table 3, we set the VAR model to the 4th order.  
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  To further understand whether there is a causal relationship between shadow banking and other economic 
variables, we carried out the Granger causality test. The results are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Granger Causality Test. 
Null hypothesis F P Conclusion 
RSB is not the Granger reason for RM2 16.11452 0.0029 reject 
RM2 is not the Granger reason for RSB 4.803838 0.3080 not reject 
RSB is not the Granger reason for RCPI 23.57488 0.0001 reject 
RCPI is not the Granger reason for RSB  1.234932 0.8723 not reject 
RSB is not the Granger reason for RGDP 11.30682 0.0233 reject 
RGDP is not the Granger reason for RSB 6.633243 0.1566 not reject 
 
Based on the results in Table 4, the null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is rejected at the 5% 
significance level for RSB, RM2, RCPI, and RGDP. It indicates that the change in the size of shadow banking 
credit creation in China will significantly impact the money supply, the price level, and economic growth. The 
analysis is consistent with the previous analysis. 
 
From the Granger causality test, we find that RM2, RCPI, and RGP are not the Granger reasons for RSB in 
the fourth-order, perhaps because their impact occurs earlier. 
 
We should ensure that the VAR model is stable before performing the impulse response function and 
variance decomposition. Therefore, we conduct an AR test on the established VAR model. The results are 
shown in Fig. 2.  
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
 
 
                                                     Figure 2: Result of AR Test 
 
According to Fig.2, the reciprocal of the AR eigenvalues all fall within the unit circle, indicating that the VAR 
model is stationary. We can perform the impulse response function and its variance analysis on the data. 
 
To further understand the impact of the size of China's shadow banking credit creation on the money supply, 
price level, and economic growth in different periods, this paper analyzes the impulse response function of 
RSB, RM2, RCPI, and RGDP.  The impulse function results are shown in Figure 3.   
 
The broad money supply (RM2) has an initial positive response to a one-unit standard deviation impulse of 
shadow bank deposits (RSB).  However, the impact falls rapidly and becomes statistically insignificant after 
the first month. The initial response is consistent with the credit creation model as an increase in the shadow 
bank deposits leads to an expansion of the money supply when the shadow bank system reserve ratio is 
less than the reserve ratio of the commercial banking system. The credit creation model indicates that 
shadow bank deposits impact the money supply in subsequent periods through multiple lending rounds. The 
lack of statistically significant impulse response results for later periods may be caused by other factors 
confounding the analysis or by changes in the shadow bank reserve ratio during different economic 
conditions. Our analysis includes expansionary and contractionary periods. Affected by the financial crisis, 
when China's economy is in a downturn, shadow banks will increase their currency reserves, reduce their 
credit creation, and reduce the money supply. When the economy experiences an upswing, shadow banks 
will pursue regulatory arbitrage, reduce their currency reserves, expand the credit creation function of shadow 
banks, and increase the money supply.  
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Therefore, in different stages of the economic cycle, China's shadow banking credit creation has a cyclical 
effect on the money supply. This reduces the measurability, controllability, and correlation of the money 
supply, increasing the difficulty of the central bank's regulation of monetary policy and the realization of the 
ultimate goals of monetary policy. 
 
The response of RGDP to the RSB impulse is negative in the first month but becomes significant and positive 
in the fourth month. These results are consistent with the IS-CC model showing an increase in equilibrium 
output with the introduction of a shadow bank credit sector.  The increase in the scale of shadow banking 
credit creation can increase the total amount of credit, provide financing for entities to meet the credit needs 
of SMEs, and support economic growth. The lag between deposits, credit creation, and economic activity 
may explain the delayed response. 
 
As shown in Fig. 3, the impulse response results for RCPI are statistically insignificant. As with the RM2 
results beyond the first period, this may due to confounding factors overwhelming the RSB results or different 
responses during contractions and expansions.  
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                                                   Figure 3: Impact of RSB on RM2, RGDP, and RCP  
Note: The red analytic asymptotic in the multiple graphs shows standard errors in calculating impulse 
responses. 
 
To further understand the degree of impact between the respective variables, we analyzed the variance 
decomposition of RSB, RM2, RGDP, and RCPI. The results, shown in Fig. 4, indicate that the vast majority 
of variance in the RM2 is endogenously driven with RSB, RGDP and RCPI contributing negligibly to its 
variance. Less of the variance of RGDP is endogenously driven. RM2, RSB and RCPI contribute slightly 
more than 40% of the RGDP variance with shadow bank deposit changes adding approximately 7% of the 
variance.  The variance in RCPI is similar to RGDP, with slightly less than 40% contributed by RM2, RGDP, 
and RSB. As expected, RM2 and RGDP play a more significant role than RSB in contributing to RCPI's 
variance.  
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                                                             Figure 4: Variance decomposition 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
We use the economic indicators of money supply, economic growth, and price levels, to analyze the 
influences of credit creation of China's shadow banks on monetary policy from the theoretical and empirical 
aspects. Using a credit creation model, we show that bank deposits shunted to the shadow banking system 
impact the money multiplier. The impact can have a cyclical aspect based upon the shadow banking reserve 
ratio responding to economic conditions. Shadow banking can have a multiplicative effect during expansions 
and a dampening effect during slowdowns, which increases the uncertainty of monetary policy.  Using a CC-
LM model, we show that shadow banking can shift the CC and LM curves, resulting in a higher economic 
output.  
 
Finally, we use a vector autoregressive statistical analysis to estimate the impact that the rate of shadow 
banking deposits has had on monetary policy goals. The Granger Causality test indicates that the growth 
rate of shadow banking deposits has Granger Causality for the growth rates of the broad money supply, 
GDP, and the CPI. The impulse response analysis indicates shows that shadow bank deposits have an initial 
positive impact on the money supply implying a multiplicative effect during an expansion and a dampening 
impact during a contraction. Later impacts are not statistically significant, which merits further study. 
Consistent with the CC-LM model, the impulse response analysis indicates that shadow bank deposits 
positively impact GDP with a lag of four periods.  The impulse response analysis did not find a statistically 
significant effect of RSB on RCPI.  The variance decomposition analysis indicated that RSB, along with 
RGDP and RCP, had a negligible impact on the RM2, indicating that the broad money supply is endogenously 
determined. The variance decomposition showed that RSB explains approximately 7% of the variance of 
RGDP and a negligible amount of the RCPI variance.   
 
Our results are consistent with the previous studies (Liu et al.,2019), indicating that shadow banking may be 
a powerful amplification mechanism that impairs monetary policy transmission and reduces its effectiveness. 
We find that shadow banking can have a multiplicative effect during expansions and a dampening effect 
during slowdowns, which increases the uncertainty of monetary policy.  Regulation seeks to strike the right 
balance between the costs and benefits of policy intervention.  Future research can determine the type of 
shadow bank regulation that would promote coordinated monetary policy and increased economic stability 
without stunting economic growth.   
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